What would an Israeli war against Hezbollah look like?

Low level exchanges of rockets between Lebanese Hezbollah and Northern Israel have been the norm since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. These were perceived to be a sub-threshold supporting effort, aiming to distract the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) with the threat of an offensive into Northern Israel forcing the commitment of resources away from the IDF’s main effort in Gaza.

Since 7 October 2023, over 150,000 people have been displaced from their homes across both sides of the border, with residents petitioning the government to improve security so they can return to their homes.

A Hezbollah propaganda video released on 17 June showed footage from a drone overflight of Haifa. The footage highlighted military sites, critical national infrastructure, and high-density civilian locations such as shopping malls.

Notably, Haifa port is approximately 30km South of the evacuated border regions, undermining confidence in Israeli Air Defence systems and promoting an immediate governmental response.

On the 19 June, the IDF Northern Command greenlit plans for a ground assault into Southern Lebanon.

New phase

Israeli prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, recently announced that the war in Gaza had reached a “new phase”, with a reduction in the scope of operations, and a focus on intelligence-led strikes. This change reduces the load on the IDF, increasing their readiness for war in the North if necessary.

However, even a limited ground offensive into Lebanon would almost certainly require the full commitment of the IDF and substantial international support in order to be effective.

An Israeli advance into Lebanon would differ significantly from previously observed operations in Gaza:

• Lebanon is far larger. Gaza had a pre-war population of 600,000 people. Comparatively, Lebanon’s capital Beirut is far larger, with an estimated population of 1.9 million. Tyre, one of the closest major cities to the border, has over 130,000 people alone, making any occupation of territory beyond the southernmost cities extremely difficult.

• The ground favours defence. Outside of the cities, the Mount Lebanon range extends over 170km through the country. In addition, Hezbollah are thought to have constructed a vast network of tunnels, with some big enough to drive vehicles through. Any attempt by the IDF to clear either of these locations would highly likely require an enormous amount of time and resources, as well as a high rate of attrition for the IDF.

• Hezbollah are not Hamas. Hezbollah are a well-resourced hybrid force, capable of both conventional and non-conventional operations. Current estimates indicate that they have 60,000-100,000 personnel and over 150,000 missiles in storage, as well as limited armour and anti-air capabilities. At the start of the Israel-Hamas war, the IDF assessed Hamas had approximately 30,000 personnel.

• Iran is watching. Iran is a key supporter of Hezbollah, providing them with the majority of their equipment, training, and funding. Compared to the near-isolated Hamas under Israel’s blockade, Hezbollah would be readily resupplied by Iran via Syria, enabling them to sustain high-tempo operations for far longer. Iran is also poised to provide direct fire support through their own arsenal of drones, missiles, and rockets as the situation developed.

• Israel would be increasingly isolated. International support for IDF operations in Gaza has rapidly declined, with mounting calls for the war to end as Palestinian civilian casualties approach 40,000. Due to the factors detailed above, a ground invasion of any size would likely necessitate extensive bombing operations in advance, highly likely drawing further international condemnation and reductions in lethal aid.